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Abstract

In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
state and local school segregation laws as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. That same day, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court
held unconstitutional de jure segregation in Washington, D.C.’s public schools under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Fifty years after it was decided,
Bolling remains one of the Warren Court’s most controversial decisions.
The controversy reflects the widespread belief that the outcome in Bolling reflected the Justices’ political preferences and was not a sound interpretation of the
Due Process Clause. The Bolling Court stands accused of “inventing” the idea
that due process includes a guarantee of equal protection equivalent to that of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
A careful analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe, however, reveals some surprises. First,
the almost universal portrayal of Bolling as an opinion relying on an ”equal protection component” of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is incorrect.
In fact, Bolling was a substantive due process opinion with roots in Lochner era
cases such as Buchanan v. Warley, Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. The Court, however, chose to rely explicitly only on Buchanan because
the other cases were too closely associated with Lochner.
Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was
not simply ”made up” by the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding
precedent.

Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia
on Supreme Court jurisprudence. Bolling would have been a much stronger opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer,
and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.
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In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court invalidated state and local
school segregation laws as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 2
That same day, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held unconstitutional de jure segregation in
Washington, D.C.’s public schools under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 3 Fifty
years after it was decided, Bolling remains one of the Warren Court’s most controversial
decisions.
The controversy reflects the widespread belief that the outcome in Bolling reflected the
Justices’ political preferences and was not a sound interpretation of the Due Process Clause. The
Bolling Court stands accused of “inventing” the idea that due process includes a guarantee of
equal protection equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 4
Bolling is especially infamous for the following dictum: “In view of our decision in Brown that
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,” Chief
Justice Earl Warren wrote, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.” 5 This dictum, considered alone, sounds very much like
a concession that the Court could find no proper legal basis for its decision in Bolling, beyond
the “unthinkability” of a contrary decision. 6
Yet the prominence given to the “unthinkable” dictum has obscured the fact that in the
preceding three paragraphs of the Bolling opinion, Warren provided a more traditional “legal”
rationale for the Court’s ruling:

1

Professor, George Mason University School of Law. An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the
Georgetown University Law Center conference Bolling v. Sharpe at 50: Desegregation in the District of Columbia:
Past, Present and Future in April 2004. The author thanks George Mason’s Law and Economics Center for
providing financial support for this Essay. Jack Balkin and Mike Seidman have provided helpful comments.
2
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
4
See infra notes 23–34 and accompanying text.
5
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
6
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 546
(1977) (noting that the Bolling opinion “lay the Court open to the charge that what it found ‘unthinkable’ was the
political implication of a contrary decision, rather than an anomaly of constitutional principle”).
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We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal
protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process.
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect. As long ago as 1896, this Court declared
the principle “that the Constitution of the United States, in its
present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the
States, against any citizen because of his race.” And in Buchanan
v. Warley, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a
property owner to convey his property to a person of another race
was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of
law.
Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with
any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from
bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be
restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segregation
in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
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governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of
the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. 7

Thus, the opinion made the following points: first, that although the Fifth Amendment,
which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause, the
concepts of equal protection and due process both arise from the American ideal of fairness. 8
While not interchangeable, the phrases are not mutually exclusive, and the Court has previously
recognized that unjustified discrimination may violate due process. 9 Second, classifications
based on race “must be scrutinized with particular care” because they run contrary to American
tradition. 10 And, third, forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools arbitrarily deprives them of
their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. 11
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court interpreted Bolling as an equal protection case, 12
and it eventually held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains an equal
protection guarantee precisely equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. 13 However, as Larry Lessig has noted, a close reading of Bolling reveals that
“[w]hat is significant about the actual opinion . . . is not that the Court found an ‘equal protection
component’ to the Due Process Clause. No such ‘component’ was ever ‘found.’” 14
While dicta in Bolling state that the concept of due process overlaps to some extent with the
concept of equal protection, the ultimate holding of the Court is based on the traditional due
process concern that the government not engage in arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 15 As Justice
David Souter has explained, Bolling concluded that the federal government had no legitimate

7

Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–500 (citations omitted).
See id. at 499.
9
See id. at 499 n.2.
10
See id. at 499.
11
See id. at 500.
12
See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964) (citing Bolling for the proposition that “while the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.”).
13
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). As we shall see, the statement in this parenthetical is incorrect, but it does reflect the state of the
law from 1975 until today.
14
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995).
15
See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
8
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government interest in requiring segregated schools that could overcome Blacks’ contrary liberty
interest not to be relegated to Jim Crow schools. 16
The only novelty in Bolling is the idea that forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools
infringed on a liberty right protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Once the
Court identified this liberty right, the only remaining question was whether the federal
government could justify school segregation as a valid exercise of the federal government’s
exercise of sovereign authority in the District of Columbia. Given that Brown failed to accord
any weight to (or even mention) the defendants’ state police power arguments in favor of
segregation, 17 the answer was obviously “no.”
Part I of this Essay reviews scholarly criticism of Bolling. With the exception of Lessig, 18
legal scholars have not seriously addressed Bolling’s stated “substantive due process” 19
rationale. Rather, scholars criticize Bolling for purportedly holding that the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause provides an equal protection guarantee equivalent to that of the Equal
Protection Clause. To critics of the Warren Court, Bolling is an example of judicial activism run
amok, with the Warren Court using the Due Process Clause to avoid reaching a constitutionally
mandated result that considered “unthinkable” for extra-legal reasons. By contrast, scholars
more sympathetic to Warren Court jurisprudence embrace the result in Bolling, but reject, or at
least refuse to endorse, its reliance on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
As we shall see in Part II, there was in fact precedent far stronger than the rather lame
precedents cited by the Court 20 supporting Bolling’s dicta that due process and equal protection
16

See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings
before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1990) (statement of Judge Souter).
17
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18
See Lessig, supra note 14.
19
I dislike the term “substantive due process,” but will use it in this Article because of its widespread use to describe
jurisprudence protecting liberty rights via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As
applied to Lochner-era jurisprudence, and perhaps even to Bolling, the phrase “substantive due process” is
anachronistic. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was
not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause was firmly separated by courts and legal
scholars into “substantive” and “procedural” categories).
20
The Court cited three Fifth Amendment cases in support of its statement that “as this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”: Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S.
329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1939); and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585
(1937). Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
Currin is of no help to the Court, as it simply states that although the exercise of the commerce power is
subject to the Fifth Amendment, “that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause.” 306 U.S.
at 14. Davis repeats the same point, though it adds that the Court assumes that discrimination in taxation, “if gross
enough, is equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment.” 301 U.S.
at 585. Detroit Bank, meanwhile, states on the one hand that the Fifth Amendment “contains no equal protection
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limits on government’s power to discriminate overlap to some extent. The historical relationship
between due process and equal protection is discussed in Part II.
More important, critics fail to grapple with Bolling’s holding that public school segregation
was an arbitrary violation of Black students’ due process liberty interest in pursuing their
education. Strong precedents from the 1910s and 1920s supported Bolling’s conclusion that due
process of law prohibited the government from classifying based on race or sex when doing so
resulted in a violation of liberty or property rights, and the classification in question was not
based on any inherent differences between the groups classified.
Bolling, in fact, referenced a 1917 precedent directly on point—Buchanan v. Warley. 21
Buchanan invalidated a residential segregation ordinance under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause as a deprivation of liberty and property not justified by the state’s claimed
police power interests in keeping the races separate. 22 Lochner era precedent also supported
Bolling’s implicit conclusion that violation of liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause
could not be justified by appeals to prejudice against, or fear of, minority groups. 23 Once the
Court identified a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of due
process of law, a deprivation of this liberty could not be justified by mere racism, sexism, or
hostility toward minorities. 24 However, as I will show in Part III, the Court failed to cite these
precedents because of Lochnerphobia—the Court, responding in particular to objections from
Justice Black, did not want to seen as endorsing or reviving the substantive due process
jurisprudence of the Lochner era.
I.

SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF BOLLING

clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress.” 317 U.S. at 337. On the other
hand, the Court acknowledges that discriminatory legislation “may be so arbitrary and injurious in character as to
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 338. Each of the latter two cases could be interpreted
not as stating that the Due Process Clause contains an equal protection component, but as stating that taxation is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause when it amounts to arbitrary confiscation. Concern with arbitrary
confiscation is not quite the same as the traditional equal protection concern with arbitrary classification. Moreover,
in each of these cases the Court ruled against the plaintiff, leaving any Fifth Amendment basis for invalidating
discriminatory legislation vague and unclear, at least based on these precedents.
21
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22
Id. at 82.
23
See infra notes 143–153 and accompanying text.
24
See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Buchanan, 245 U.S. at
60. Lessig asserts that Bolling recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment inaugurated a “middle republic” granting
full citizenship rights to African Americans, after which “[f]ederal powers can no longer be used to advance
interests of racial inequality.” Lessig, supra note 14, at 410.
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As noted previously, scholarly criticism of Bolling typically finds fault in the opinion’s
purported discovery of an “equal protection component” to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, or criticizes the Court for its “unthinkable” dictum. But scholars have not seriously
addressed the Court’s underlying rationale for its decision—that Black children forced to attend
segregated schools were being deprived of liberty without due process, a deprivation not justified
by any valid police power rationale.
Critics of the Warren Court’s alleged judicial activism have been especially scathing in their
criticism of Bolling. 25 Raoul Berger states that the so-called “equal protection tradition” of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was “born” in Bolling. 26 But he regards the idea that the
Due Process Clause contains an equal protection guarantee as “quite untenable.” 27 First, he
argues that “the conception of due process constitutionalized in 1789 could not contain an as yet
unknown component.” 28 Second, he observes that “the framers of the fourteenth amendment
added to due process an equal protection clause, a considered judgment that the due process
clause had no element of equal protection.” 29
Similarly, Robert Bork sharply criticizes Bolling, calling it “social engineering from the
bench,” a mistaken interpretation of due process on par with Dred Scott and Lochner. 30 He
(incorrectly) states that the Bolling Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause “included the same equal protection . . . concept” as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause 31 and that this conclusion “rested on no precedent or history.” 32 Bork also
addresses the Court’s reliance on due process more generally. He asserts that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment understood due process to refer to procedures only, which is why they
also included a “requirement of equal protection in the substance of state laws.” 33 Bork’s view,
25

Thus, one can describe Bolling as “universally accepted” only if one limits the universe to supporters of Warren
Court jurisprudence. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) (describing Bolling as
“universally accepted” but noting the difficulty of justifying it using originalist methods of constitutional
interpretation).
26
Raoul Berger, Insulation Of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment On Lawrence Sager’s “Court-Stripping” Polemic,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 629 n.173 (1983).
27
Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Robert Bork, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 993, 1015 (1991).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 83-84 (1990).
31
As noted previously, the Bolling Court did not state this, though later Supreme Court opinions did. See
Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
32
BORK, supra note 30, at 83.
33
Id.
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of course, would lead to the abolition of substantive due process opinions, so his critique goes
well beyond the Bolling opinion.
Michael McConnell, meanwhile, concludes that “[t]he suggestion that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits segregation of public facilities is without
foundation.” 34 McConnell finds it not just “thinkable” but highly plausible that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment sought to put equal protection restrictions on the states that they did not
seek to put on the federal government, given the Republicans’ firm control of Congress, and their
strong distrust of the recently-rebellious southern states.
Professor Lino Graglia is perhaps the most scathing critic of the Court’s decision in
Bolling. 35 In Graglia’s view, Bolling shows that activist Justices ignore the text of the
Constitution to achieve desired political results. 36 Graglia writes that “everyone knows, or thinks
he knows, that school racial segregation was held unconstitutional in Brown because the Court
found it prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 37 He argues,
however, that “the Equal Protection Clause was not necessary to the decision; that is, the same
result could and would have been reached in its absence.” 38
To prove his thesis, Graglia points to Bolling:
On the same day the Court decided Brown, it also decided Bolling v.
Sharpe, a challenge to school racial segregation by federal law in the
District of Columbia. Because the Equal Protection Clause occurs only in
the Fourteenth Amendment, which does not apply to the federal
government, it was not available for the case. What difference did its
absence make in the result reached? None at all; school segregation was
found no less constitutionally prohibited in the District of Columbia. . . .
This time, however, segregation was found to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does apply to the federal
government. In other words, we are asked to believe that a constitutional
provision adopted in 1791 as part of a Constitution that explicitly
34

Michael W. McConnell, Michael W. McConnell (concurring in the judgment), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 158, 166 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
35
Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767,
774 (1998).
36
See id.
37
Id.
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recognized and protected slavery was meant to prohibit school racial
segregation. If the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not
exist, the Court would simply have had to rely, with equal validity, on
some other constitutional provision, perhaps the provision prohibiting
discrimination among seaports. 39

Lucas Powe, though not a consistent critic of the Warren Court, finds the Court’s reliance on
the Due Process Clause in Bolling “stunning.” 40 Powe states that Warren could have shown that
the due process had a strong equal protection component prior to the Civil War “but this had
been lost in history, and Warren did not rediscover it. He just asserted the point.” 41 According
to Powe, the Supreme Court had never before found that the due process and equal protection
clauses banned similar actions. 42
Other legal scholars, generally those more sympathetic to the Warren Court and its
egalitarian jurisprudence, support the result in Bolling, but none seem to have endorsed the
Court’s due process reasoning. Indeed, several prominent scholars have harshly criticized
Bolling, often misinterpreting Bolling as an equal protection case. Sandy Levinson writes that
“[t]here is no satisfactory theory . . . that explains the imposition on the federal government . . .
of the equal protection norms.” 43 John Hart Ely calls the Bolling decision “gibberish both
syntactically and historically.” 44 Thomas Grey cites Bolling an example of “when the Court
treats the words of the Constitution as essentially irrelevant to its decision.” 45
Frank Michelman adds that “[i]t may well be true that the original American constitutional
conception of due process of law reflected a natural right tradition—‘a higher law background,’
as it has been called—containing a requirement of formal generality in law and formal equality
before the law.” 46 However, Michelman adds that the antebellum constitutional understanding

38

Id.
Id.
40
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 32 (2000).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 147(1988).
44
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32 (1980).
45
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 230 (1988).
46
Frank I. Michelman, Frank I. Michelman (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 124, 128.
39
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cut from this tradition would not have precluded de jure segregation. 47 Lawrence Sager,
meanwhile, is greatly troubled by the “baldly prochronistic doctrine that the due process clause
of the fifth amendment incorporates the principles which underlie the equal protection clause
(ratified roughly 100 years later).” 48 Akhil Amar argues that the words “due process” in the
Fifth Amendment mean the same thing as the words “due process” in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which in turn must mean something different than the words “equal protection” in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 49
Scholars seeking to justify the result in Bolling instead rely on their own creative
constitutional reasoning. Drew Days, for example, asserts that the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment supports the result in Bolling. 50 Michelman rests his defense of the
result in Bolling on unwritten constitutional principle found in neither the history nor the text of
the Constitution. 51 Amar relies on the Citizenship Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the
Titles of Nobility Clause to support the result in Bolling. 52 Jack Balkin argues that a complex
combination of structural, textual, and historical arguments justifies the result in Bolling. 53 Like
Balkin, Bruce Ackerman argues that integrated public school education in the District of
Columbia was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, and, like Days, justifies Bolling on
the basis of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 54
John Hart Ely, writing twenty or so years after his initial condemnation of Bolling, argues
that “it was the office of the Equal Protection Clause unequivocally to apply to the states a
command of equality of the sort that the original framers, and this Court among others, had
already acknowledged in various contexts to be constitutionally aplicable to the federal
government.” 55 Even Ely, however, is unwilling to endorse the Bolling Court’s Due Process
Clause argument. He neglects the view that Bolling was an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty”
47

Id. at 129.
Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What On Earth
Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 262 (1988).
49
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (1999).
50
Drew S. Days, III, Drew S. Days, III (concurring), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID,
supra note 34, at 92, 97–98.
51
Michelman, supra note 46, at 131–32.
52
Amar, supra note 49, at 768–72.
53
Jack Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education—A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 3, 63–64.
54
Bruce Ackerman, Bruce Ackerman (concurring), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID,
supra note 34, at 100, 114–16.
55
John Hart Ely, John Hart Ely (concurring in the judgment except as to the remedy), WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
48
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case rather than an equal protection case, and expressly passes on the question of “whether the
term ‘due process’ can responsibly [be interpreted] to contain” a “command of equality” similar
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 56 Instead, to support Bolling’s
outcome, Ely relies on the Declaration of Independence, various early nineteenth-century cases,
and especially the Ninth Amendment. 57
Thus, legal scholars almost completely ignore Bolling’s holding that substantive due process
prohibits the Federal Government from arbitrarily restricting Blacks to segregated public
schools. And to the extent that they see Bolling as an equal protection case, they fail to consider
whether there was a basis in precedent for the notion that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause creates limits on discriminatory legislation. The historical relationship between due
process and antidiscrimination concerns is discussed in the next Part of this Essay.

II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The idea that due process considerations limited government’s power to discriminate
stretches back to the early years of the American republic. 58 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent it was thought to have “substance” at all, was initially
thought to include—and perhaps even be limited to—a prohibition on discriminatory “class”
legislation. 59 In the early twentieth century, several state courts explicitly invalidated
discriminatory legislation based solely on due process considerations. 60
During the Lochner era, Supreme Court litigants frequently asserted that the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause included an equal protection component. The Court initially
remained agnostic on the matter. However, by 1921, the Court acknowledged in dicta that the
concept of due process contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments included an equal
protection component, albeit a weaker one than that contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. And in 1923, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court invalidated a

EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 135, 139.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
See Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 269–70 (1829). See generally RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW
(1926).
59
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
60
See infra note 80.
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District of Columbia law that mandated minimum wages for women in part because of equality
concerns raised under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 61
Meanwhile, Buchanan v. Warley suggested that once a court identified a recognized due
process liberty or property interest invaded by a statute or government policy, that law or policy
could not be defended under the police power based on a discriminatory rationale. 62 This
understanding of the egalitarian limits on the assertion of the police power to justify
infringements on rights protected by due process was reiterated in Adkins, where the Court held
that outdated notions of women’s capabilities could not justify a sex-based minimum wage
law. 63
A.

THE PRE-LOCHNER UNDERSTANDING OF DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON DISCRIMINATION

Let us recall what legal scholars have written about the Court’s proclamation in Bolling that
“discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be a violation of due process,” and its further
dictum that it’s “unthinkable” that the Federal Government may segregate public schools when
states may not. 64 Raoul Berger claims that the idea that the due process includes an equal
protection component was “born” in Bolling. 65 Robert Bork argues that the Court’s assertions
“rested on no precedent or history.” 66 Lucas Powe asserts that the Supreme Court had never
before found that the due process and equal protection clauses banned similar actions. 67
Lawrence Sager finds Bolling’s antidiscrimination doctrine “baldly prochronistic.” 68 Akhil
Amar insists that the meanings of due process and equal protection do not overlap. 69
In fact, however, a long tradition in American thought held that for legislation to be
considered “the law of the land,” and thus consistent with due process, it must be a “general and
public law, equally binding upon every member of the community.” 70 Meanwhile, “every partial
or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void.” 71 By the postbellum period, “partial” or
“unequal” legislation was usually referred to as “class legislation.” 72 While some authors have
61

See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
63
See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561.
64
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
65
See Berger, supra note 27, at 629 n.173.
66
See BORK, supra note 30, at 83.
67
POWE, supra note 40, at 32.
68
See Sager, supra note 48, at 262.
69
See Amar, supra note 49, at 767.
70
Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 270 (1829).
71
Id.
72
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
62
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closely associated the concept of class legislation with the modern concept of special interest
legislation, 73 in practice, by the late nineteenth century, class legislation was primarily legislation
that contained arbitrary classifications. 74
In the period just before the Court adopted the liberty of contract doctrine, Supreme Court
precedent suggested that when states asserted they were acting within their police power, due
process protection included, or perhaps was even limited to, a ban on class legislation. The
Equal Protection Clause, of course, also prohibited unequal legislation, and did so more
specifically. 75 Thus, while the Due Process Clause protected procedural rights from state
interference, its substantive component overlapped with the Equal Protection Clause.
Indeed, in Dent v. West Virginia, 76 the Supreme Court even declared that an absence of
arbitrary classification bars both equal protection and due process claims against regulatory
legislation. The Court stated, “legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights
without due process of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it
relates.” 77 More often cited was dictum from Leeper v. Texas, 78 stating that “due process is . . .
secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise
of the powers of government unrestrained by the established principles of private right and
distributive justice.” 79 However, unlike some state courts, 80 the Supreme Court did not actually
73

See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993).
See Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court: 1873-1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 688–
89 (1980).
75
See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 33 (1884). See generally Kay, supra note 74.
76
129 U.S. 114 (1889); cf. State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (Ohio 1900) (“The test of uniform operation, and with
respect to the required conformity to the ‘law of the land’ and to the requirement of ‘due process of law,’ seems to
be that if the law under consideration operates equally upon all who come within the class to be affected, embracing
all persons who are or may be in like situation and circumstances, and the designation of the class is reasonable, not
unjust nor capricious or arbitrary, but based upon a real distinction, the law does operate uniformly, and if, added to
this, the law is enforced by usual and appropriate methods, the requirement as to ‘due process of law’ is satisfied.”)
77
Dent, 129 U.S. at 124
78
139 U.S. 462, 468 (1891).
79
Id. This dictum was cited in Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471, 478 (1902), and
Giozza v. Teirnan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893). See also Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891) (quoting but not
explicitly citing Leeper). This language was quoted as late as 1921 by the Alabama Supreme Court in Barrington v.
Barrington, 89 So. 512, 513 (Ala. 1921).
80
In Hyland v. Sharp, 41 So. 264 (Miss. 1906), the Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated a law taxing the lending
of money when the collateral for the loan was domestic securities. The court found that the law involved an
arbitrary classification. “Can it be possible,” the court asked rhetorically, “that argument should be needed to show
that the Legislature could not vary the occupation tax by the single consideration as to the kind of security taken for
a loan?” Id. at 264. The court acknowledged that the purpose of the law was to reach those who lend at exorbitant
interest to necessitous persons, with the penalty being the loss of essential household goods. Id. at 265. But by
banning the use of household items as collateral, without regard to the interest rate of the loan or the actual use of
the item in question, there was an arbitrary deprivation of property rights without due process of law. Id.; see also
74
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hold any class legislation to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, relying instead on
the Equal Protection Clause. 81
B.

THE UNSETTLED STATE OF DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON DISCRIMINATION DURING THE LOCHNER
ERA

By the time Lochner v. New York was decided in 1905, 82 the U.S. Supreme Court had
retreated from its statement in Dent v. West Virginia that a law that was not class legislation
could not violate the Due Process Clause. In a series of opinions in the 1890s, the Court, usually
speaking through Justice Brewer, Harlan, or Peckham, declared that “liberty of contract,” along
with other vaguely defined fundamental liberties, 83 were protected against arbitrary legislation
by the Due Process Clause. 84 In Lochner itself, the Court declined the opportunity to rely on a
class legislation argument, instead relying on a liberty of contract argument to invalidate a
maximum hours law for bakers. 85 It was Lochner’s substitution of fundamental rights analysis
for class legislation analysis that allowed the 1920s Supreme Court to broaden due process
protection of liberty interests to noneconomic matters in cases such as Pierce v. Society of
Sisters 86 and Gitlow v. New York. 87
Rodge v. Kelly, 40 So. 552, 554 (Miss. 1906) (“As written, the statute is unfortunately class legislation, falling
within the inhibition of the constitutional provisions named [due process and equal protection].”). In State ex rel.
Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 55 S.W. 627, 632 (Mo. 1900), the Missouri Supreme Court invalidated a law that prohibited
employers with more than fifteen employees from selling certain items in large cities without a license. Due process
of law, “when having reference to legislative enactments, must mean a requirement of action or abstinence, binding
upon and affecting alike each and every member of the community of the same class, or of similar circumstances,
enacted for the general public good or welfare.” Id. The law in question, by contrast, involved classification that
was “was wholly without reason or necessity. It is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to defy suggestion to the
contrary. The simple statement of its creation is a most fatal blow to its continued existence. It is truly
‘classification run wild.’ It is special legislation unrestrained.” Id.
81
See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 570 (1902) (invalidating an antitrust law that
exempted only farmers and ranchers); Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U. S. 79, 114-15 (1901) (Harlan, J., concurring for
six Justices) (invalidating a mine inspection law because it applied only to one of the many mining companies in the
state); Gulf, Colo., & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 166 (1897) (invalidating a law that allowed plaintiffs
with small claims against railroads to recover fees and costs if the railroad initially refused to pay the claim and then
lost at trial, with three Justices dissenting); Kay, supra note 74.
Note that my interpretation differs from Gillman’s, who sees the Lochner line of cases as reflecting opposition
to class legislation. My differences with Gillman are explored in David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Revisionism]. Similarly, I reject Cass Sunstein’s view that the Lochner line of cases primarily reflected a
desire to uphold common law norms against legislative redistribution. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003).
82
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
83
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
84
See, e.g., id. at 589 (1897) (Peckham, J.); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1895) (Brewer, J.);
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 661–663 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85
See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 81.
86
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law banning private schools).
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Once due process became the basis for protection of fundamental rights in the late 1890s,
the Court—which had previously stated that the Due Process Clause’s only substantive
protection was equality—suggested that the equality component of due process was minimal, if it
existed at all. In District of Columbia v. Brooke, 88 for example, the plaintiff challenged a
District of Columbia law that required resident owners of property to connect their property to a
drainage system on penalty of criminal punishment, while merely assessing nonresident owners
the cost of having the city do the work for them. The Court stated, “The defendant in error
asserts this discrimination and argues its consequences at some length, but does not refer to any
provision of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits Congress from enacting laws
which discriminate in their operation between persons or things.” 89 A commentator wrote that
this language “intimates” that “Congress may enact class legislation” and asserting that “[t]his
opinion would seem to be correct.” 90
The commentator, however, ignored the Brooke Court’s caveat: the Court added that “the
question of the power of Congress, broadly considered, to discriminate in its legislation, is not
necessary to decide.” 91 Even if “such power is expressly or impliedly prohibited,” the Court
stated, the “prohibition cannot be stricter or more extensive” than the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause upon the states, and this law would be valid if enacted by
a state. 92
Indeed, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation often argued that the
Due Process Clause placed similar or equivalent restrictions on the federal government as the
Equal Protection Clause put on the states. The Court, while sometimes entertaining such claims,
was careful not to endorse this position. 93 In McCray v. United States, 94 for example, the Court
stated,
87

268 U.S. 652 (1925) (suggesting that freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
88
214 U.S. 138, 142 (1909).
89
Id. at 149.
90
E. Connor Hall, Due Process of Law and Class Legislation, 43 AM. L. REV. 926, 927 (1909).
91
Brooke, 214 U.S. at 150.
92
Id.
93
The Court’s hesitation in acknowledging an equal protection component to due process seems to call into question
the views of those, such as Howard Gillman, who argue that Lochner-era liberty of contract due process
jurisprudence was primarily about opposition to unequal “class legislation.” See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 73. For
a provocative and stimulating attempt to reconcile various understandings of Lochner-era due process jurisprudence,
see Barry Cashman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, ___ B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
94
195 U.S. 27, 61-62 (1904).
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Conceding, merely for the sake of argument, that the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment would avoid an exertion of the taxing power which, without any basis for
classification, arbitrarily taxed one article and excluded an article of the same class,
such concession would be wholly inapposite to the case in hand.
In United States v. Heinze, 95 the Court assumed without deciding “that Congress may not
discriminate in its legislation,” but noted that even with that assumption, Congress still has the
general power to make reasonable classifications in legislation. 96 In the Second Employers’
Liability Cases, 97 the Court concluded that a law that imposed liability only on interstate carriers
by railroad was constitutional “[e]ven if it be assumed that that clause is equivalent to the ‘equal
protection of the laws’ clause of the 14th Amendment, which is the most that can be claimed for
it here.” 98
Lower federal courts were similarly circumspect. One court stated that the only possible
prohibition on federal discriminatory legislation was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment:
The limitation in the former is ‘without due process of law.’ In the fourteenth
amendment this limitation is accompanied with a prohibition of the denial of the ‘equal
protection of the laws.’ Of course, the latter expression is broader than the former,
although it must be conceded that the mere denial of the ‘equal protection of the laws’
might run into the other limitation. 99
Another court held that even if the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is broad enough
to guarantee “equal protection of the laws” against Congressional action to the same extent the
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals vis-a-vis the states, it would still deny the
defendant’s claim. 100 Similarly, a federal district court concluded that even if the Fifth
Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting discriminatory legislation, the law at issue was
not discriminatory, nor did it create an arbitrary classification. 101
95

218 U.S. 532, 546 (1910).
Id.
97
223 U.S. 1(1912).
98
Id. at 52–53.
99
United States v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 165 F. 742, 745–746 (C.C.Mass. 1908).
100
Watson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 169 F. 942, 947 (D. Ark. 1909).
101
Coca-Cola Co. v. Nashville Syrup Co., 200 F. 153, 155 (D. Tenn. 1912). In yet another case, a plaintiff argued
that a District of Columbia law was unconstitutional class legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
96
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At least one federal court, however, explicitly found an equality guarantee in the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. A 1911 circuit court opinion stated that the “due process of
law” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment “implies the administration of equal laws according to
established rules by competent tribunals.” 102
Meanwhile, with the exception of cases involving what we today would call “regulatory
takings” and decided as property rather than liberty cases, 103 there were no United States
Supreme Court cases decided just before or during the Lochner era clearly invalidating
legislation as “class,” “unequal,” “special,” “partial,” or “discriminatory” legislation by relying
on the Due Process Clause alone. 104 Most Supreme Court discussions of class legislation
involved only the Equal Protection Clause, even in cases in which due process claims were
raised. 105 For example, the Court held that a law creating special, more lenient rules for torts
committed by striking workers violated the fundamental rights of employers under the Due
Process Clause. The Court then held that the rules in question also constituted illicit class
legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. 106
Nevertheless, treatise writers insisted that due process contained an equal protection
component. Hannis Taylor, author of 1917’s Due Process of Law and The Equal Protection of
the Laws, wrote that the idea that “the generality and equality of laws, as a necessary part of due
process, is purely an American creation.” 107 He added that these were, in fact, elements inherent
in due process in its American form; they existed long before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and were therefore something independent of the guarantee that no state shall
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 108

noted that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state legislation and not to D.C., but assumed arguendo that a
prohibition on class legislation by Congress in the District of Colunbia may be implied “from our form of
government.” Siddons v. Edmonston, 42 App. D.C. 459, 466 (1914).
102
United States v. Billings 190 F. 359, 363 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (emphasis added).
103
See generally Cashman, supra note 93 (noting that rate regulation cases comprised a large percentage of
Lochner-era Fourteenth Amendment cases, and that these cases “would eventually find a settled home in the Due
Process rather than Equal Protection Clause”).
104
Some early cases relied on both an equal protection and due process analysis to invalidate laws that unjustly
discriminated, including what one author claims was the first case in which the Court declared that a state police
regulation was unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with due process “as a substantive requirement.” See
Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); MOTT, supra note 58, at 341.
105
See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333-34 (1921).
106
Id.
107
Hannis Taylor, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 297 (1917).
108
Id. at 307.
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Five years later, Charles K. Burdick wrote that the Due Process Clause established “as a
standard those principles of liberty and justice which lie at the foundation of our Anglo-Saxon
institutions.” 109 He added:

No federal legislation has as yet been declared lacking in due process because it denied
the equal protection of the laws. On the other hand the Supreme Court has entertained
and given serious consideration to attacks upon federal legislation based upon the
ground that, because of unreasonable classification, it denied the protection of
reasonably equal laws . . . . It seems, therefore, that the conception of due process does
exclude legislation which inflicts inequality of burden, which is clearly arbitrary, and
without any basis in reason. 110

Indeed, the Court ultimately did not completely abandon the equality component of due
process. Rather, the Court limited due process’s potency and scope, so that the Equal Protection
Clause remained the primary barrier to class legislation, with due process playing only a
subsidiary role, providing only a “required minimum” of protection against unequal laws. Chief
Justice Taft explained in Truax v. Raich in 1921:

The [equal protection] clause is associated in the amendment with the due process
clause and it is customary to consider them together. It may be that they overlap, that a
violation of one may involve at times the violation of the other, but the spheres of the
protection they offer are not coterminous. The due process clause brought down from
Magna Charta was found in the early state constitutions and later in the Fifth
Amendment to the federal Constitution as a limitation upon the executive, legislative
and judicial powers of the federal government, while the equality clause does not appear
in the Fifth Amendment and so does not apply to congressional legislation. The due
process clause requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and
the benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial,
109

CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 408 (1922);
see also Oliver H. Dean, The Law of the Land, 48 AM. L. REV 641, 668 (1914).
110
Id. at 418–419.
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so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society. It, of course, tends to secure
equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for every
one’s right of life, liberty, and property, which the Congress or the Legislature may not
withhold. Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle
of equality of application of the law. ‘All men are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a
government of laws and not of men,’ ‘No man is above the law,’ are all maxims
showing the spirit in which Legislatures, executives and courts are expected to make,
execute and apply laws. But the framers and adopters of this amendment were not
content to depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process clause, or upon the
spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion. They therefore
embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty. 111
That same year, in La Belle Iron Works v. United States, 112 the Court, while noting that the Fifth
Amendment has no equal protection clause, suggested that some more flexible limits are placed
on unequal [federal] taxation by the “more general requirement of due process of law in
taxation.” 113
The equal protection component of due process also played a significant role in one of the
most controversial cases of the Lochner era, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital. 114 In Adkins, the
Court held that a federally-mandated minimum wage for women in the District of Columbia
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland
argued that, in regulating wages, the law violated liberty of contract without a proper police
power rationale, 115 a traditional due process concern. Other rationales provided by Sutherland,
however, seem closer to traditional equal protection analysis, though Sutherland couched these

111

Truax, 257 U.S. at 331-32 (citation omitted).
256 U.S. 377 (1921).
113
Id. at 393. This language seemed to implicitly overrule language in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co. 240 U.S. 1,
24 (1916), suggesting that the Fifth Amendment placed no limits on Congress’s taxing power:
So far as the due process clause of the 5th Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is
no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon
the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the
Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and
taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause.
114
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
115
Id. at 554-555.
112
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concerns in terms of the statute’s arbitrariness, as opposed to discrimination per se. First,
Sutherland suggested that the most constitutionally suspect aspect of the minimum wage law in
question was that it placed an arbitrary, unfair burden on a particular class, employers, who
should not be expected to bear the costs of supporting employees who lacked the skills to earn a
better wage. The Court also suggested that the law contained arbitrary classifications because it
purported to provide a minimum living wage for women, yet assigned different wages to women
in different occupations, and did not take into account the disparate needs of different women. 116

C.

THE EQUALITY COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS AS A LIMIT ON POLICE POWER RATIONALES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

With the exception of the rate regulation cases and the odd ambiguous case arising under
federal law such as Adkins, while the Equal Protection Clause prohibited all discriminatory
legislation that did not have a valid police power justification, due process only entered the
equality picture when a legal classification infringed on a liberty or property right recognized by
the Court. Once the Court found such an infringement, mere hostility against the group
negatively affected by the classification could not justify the infringement. Moreover, even
government ends considered legitimate could not justify the infringement if the means chosen
created too great a burden on liberty or property rights, if there was not a tight means-ends fit.
This line of reasoning seems to have originated in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 117 though Harlan did not explicitly rely on the Due Process Clause. Harlan’s
opinion is often interpreted to mean that racial classifications are always invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause, but it says no such thing. Rather, Harlan argued that the railroad segregation
law in question violated the “personal liberty” of black and white citizens to share a railroad car
if they so choose:

It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate
against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and
colored citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty. Every

116
117

Id. at 556-57.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as
to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white
persons. Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination
among whites in the matter of commodation for travelers. The thing to
accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for
whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while
traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in
candor as to assert the contrary. The fundamental objection, therefore, to
the statute, is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens.
“Personal liberty,” it has been well said, “consists in the power of
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to
whatsoever places one’s own inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.” If a white man
and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance on a public
highway, it is their right to do so; and no government, proceeding alone on
grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of
each. 118

Harlan then argued that infringement on this liberty cannot be justified by a desire to maintain
white supremacy. 119
Twelve years later, Harlan authored a similar dissent in Berea College v. Kentucky, 120
arguing that mandatory segregation in private schools violated liberty rights without a valid
police power purpose:

The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the
Almighty for beneficent purposes; and its use may not be
forbidden or interfered with by government—certainly not, unless
118

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
For an excellent discussion of the Plessy dissent, see Alexander T. Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan’s
Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961.
120
211 U.S. 45 (1908).
119
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such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or
imperils the public safety. The right to impart instruction,
harmless in itself or beneficial to those who receive it, is a
substantial right of property—especially, where the services are
rendered for compensation. But even if such right be not strictly a
property right, it is, beyond question, part of one’s liberty as
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of the
United States. . . . Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of
race that an American government, professedly based on the
principles of freedom, and charged with the protection of all
citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the
matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes, simply
because of their respective races? 121

The majority evaded Harlan’s argument by holding that the law was justified not as a police
power measure, but as a modification of Berea College’s state corporate charter. 122
Harlan’s line of reasoning, however, was implicitly adopted in the 1917 case of Buchanan
v. Warley. 123 Some scholars have portrayed Buchanan as an Equal Protection Clause case, but
the Equal Protection Clause never appears in the opinion, even though it was explicitly relied
upon in the plaintiff’s briefs. 124 The Court instead relied on the plaintiff’s alternative argument,
that the statute infringed on the Due Process Clause’s protection of property. Noting this
reliance, some scholars have portrayed Buchanan as a pure property rights case, divorced from
any concerns for equality. 125 A close reading of the case belies this interpretation as well. 126
121

Id. at 67–69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a discussion, see David E. Bernstein, Plessy versus Lochner: The Berea College Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93
(2000).
123
245 U.S. 60 (1917).
124
Brief for Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing at 27–36, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Brief for Plaintiff in
Error at 26, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
125
See ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 811-12 (1986)
(recounting the views of those who think that Buchanan was purely a property rights decision); ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 139 (1988); (“The usual explanation for how it came about that the Supreme Court
should vote unanimously to strike down a segregation ordinance in 1917—is that Buchanan is essentially a decision
defense of property rights.”). A more nuanced view is taken by Michael Klarman, who concludes that “Buchanan
probably had more to do property rights than with civil rights.” MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS 82 (2004).
122
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The Court did indeed rely on the right to alienate property as the basis of its holding in
Buchanan, but equality concerns came into play as well. The question before the Court was
whether the law infringed on property rights for a valid police power purpose. 127 After
recounting the post-Civil War statutory and constitutional attempts to protect the rights of
African Americans, the Court concluded that “[c]olored persons are citizens of the United States
and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating
against them solely on account of color.” 128 The state’s “attempt to prevent the alienation of the
property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of
law.” 129
The Court specifically rejected each of Kentucky’s asserted police power rationales for
upholding the law. First, the Court dismissed the argument that existing “race hostility” was an
appropriate rationale for narrowing the scope of citizens’ constitutional rights. The Court also
rejected the argument that the segregation law came within the police power because it would
promote the public peace by preventing race conflict. While the Court acknowledged that this
was a desirable goal, it could not be accomplished “by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.” 130
The Court added that a segregation law could not be justified as promoting the
“maintenance of the purity of the races.” 131 The Court noted that the law did not directly
prohibit the “amalgamation of the races.” 132 The law did not even prohibit African Americans
from working in white households. 133 Rather, the right at issue, according to the Court, was “the
civil right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and
of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person.” 134 Finally, the Court spurned
126

For additional discussion, see David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered,
114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Restraining Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 799 (1998)
127
The Court acknowledged that “property may be controlled in the exercise of the police power in the interest of
the public health, convenience, or welfare.” Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74.
128
Id. at 78–79.
129
Id. at 82.
130
Id. at 81.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See id.
134
Id.
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the claim that the law was necessary to prevent the depreciation in the value of property owned
by white people when African Americans became their neighbors. 135 The Court noted that
property owned by “undesirable white neighbors” or “put to disagreeable though lawful uses”
could similarly depreciate property. 136 The Court implied that African Americans had to be
treated as rights-bearing individuals and not as members of a subordinate class. The Court
reaffirmed Buchanan’s holding in 1927 137 and 1930. 138
Six years after Buchanan, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia, 139
the Court invalidated a minimum wage law for women using an analogous line of reasoning. In
Buchanan, the Court had identified the right to acquire and alienate property as an interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. In Adkins, the Court identified liberty of contract as a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. In Buchanan, the Court held that denial of
property rights for African Americans could not be based on weak race-related police power
rationales. In Adkins, the Court held that women could not be denied liberty of contract based
solely on weak gender-related police power rationales.
The government in Adkins asserted that the minimum wage law was necessary to preserve
women workers’ “good health” and “morals.” 140 Sutherland wrote that women were, after
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, fully equal citizens, which in turn created a presumption
that laws subjecting women to special disabilities or privileges are unconstitutional. 141 He wrote,

135

Id. at 82.
Id.
137
Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927).
138
City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
139
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
140
Id. at 540.
141
Sutherland was undoubtedly sincere in his advocacy of women’s rights, having been an advocate of women’s
suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment in his earlier political career. See Speech of Sen. George Sutherland of
Utah, at the Woman Suffrage Meeting, Belasco Theater 3–4 (Dec. 13, 1915) (“To my own mind the right of women
to vote is as obvious as my own. . . . [W]omen on the average are as intelligent as men, as patriotic as men, as
anxious for good government as men. . . . [T]o deprive them of the right to participate in the government is to make
an arbitrary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground that one class is made up of men, and
should therefore rule, and the other class is made of women, who should, therefore, be ruled.”). Sutherland was an
adviser to Alice Paul, leader of the National Woman’s Party, which advocated an Equal Rights Amendment that,
among other things, would have banned special protective legislation for women. See Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 97, 1013 (2002).
Felix Frankfurter attacked Sutherland’s opinion in Adkins as a “triumph for the Alice Paul theory of constitutional
law, which is to no little extent a reflex of the thoughtless, unconsidered assumption that in industry it makes no
difference whether you are a man or woman,” quoted in ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR
LEGISLATION 98 (1925).
136
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while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, and legislation
fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account, we cannot
accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case
of men under similar circumstances.142

Also in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause a Nebraska law banning the teaching of foreign
languages to schoolchildren. The Court recognized a liberty interest in parents providing an
education for their children, and found that the law infringed on that interest without a proper
police power rationale. Meyer was a “Lochnerian” decision. As Robert Post notes, Meyer built
on the Lochner line of economic liberty cases but “resolutely refuses to confine that realm [of
liberty] to mere matters of economic exchange. This refusal is particularly striking because the
[opinion’s] assertions [of broad liberty rights] are supported only by the citation of a long string
of substantive due process decisions dealing with specifically economic regulation, ranging from
Lochner itself to Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.” 143
The Meyer law had been motivated by nativist hysteria attendant to World War I, and the
state claimed the following police power justifications for the law:

[T]he purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by
inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and
ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals; and
“that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all
children reared in this State.” It is also affirmed that the foreign born
population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign
words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the
142

261 U.S. at 540. Thus, if one considers the actions of the D.C. government in the 1920s to be “federal action,”
Matthew Perry is incorrect when he argues that Justice Frank Murphy’s opinions in a series of cases in the mid1940s “represent the first time a Supreme Court Justice not only suggested, but recognized and then applied an equal
protection guarantee, through use of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to federal governmental
action which affected civil rights and liberties.” Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy And The Fifth Amendment Equal
Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 243, 247 (2000).
143
Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489,
1532–33 (1998).
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children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful
type and the public safety is imperiled. 144

The Court, while acknowledging the importance of ensuring that children attain proficiency in
English, rejected the none-too-subtle discriminatory impetus behind the law, concluding that “the
statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency
of the state.” 145
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court invalidated an Oregon law inspired
by anti-Catholic sentiment that prohibited private school education. 146 The Court reasserted the
right of parents to direct their children’s education, and completely ignored the state’s asserted
police power interest in mandating that all children attend the public school “melting pot” that
would create a homogenous citizenry. 147
The Court faced a similar issue in 1927 in Farrington v. Tokushige, which involved a
challenge to a law designed to shut down Japanese-language schools in Hawaii, then a federal
territory. 148 The Ninth Circuit noted that the government’s justification for the law was based on
the fact that Hawaii had “a large Japanese population,” and that “the Japanese do not readily
assimilate with other races; that they still adhere to their own ideals and customs, and are still
loyal to their emperor.” 149 The Supreme Court opaquely stated that it “appreciated the grave
problems incident to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Islands.” 150 However, the Court
concluded that “[t]he Japanese parent has the right to direct the education of his own child
without unreasonable restrictions; the Constitution protects him as well as those who speak
another tongue.” 151
Thus, by the late 1920s, several precedents held that once the Court identified a liberty
interest protected against government interference by the requirement of due process of law, the
government could not justify legislative interference with that interest by appealing to prejudice
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Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
Id. at 403.
146
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
147
See Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary v. Pierce, 296 F. 928, 938 (D. Ore. 1924), aff’d
sub. nom. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
148
273 U.S. 284 (1927).
149
Farrington v. Tokushige, 11 F.2d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
150
273 U.S. at 299.
151
Id. at 298.
145
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against, or stereotypes about, the group the legislation targeted. And like Bolling, two of these
precedents, Adkins and Tokushige, arose under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
By the time Bolling v. Sharpe was decided in 1954, most of these precedents were moribund
because of the Court’s rejection of Lochnerian jurisprudence in the late 1930s. The Court
explicitly overruled Adkins in 1937. 152 The following year, it reinterpreted Meyer, Pierce, and
Tokushige as opinions protecting minority nationalities and religions from discriminatory
legislation, 153 rather than as substantive due process liberty opinions holding that discriminatory
impulses are not valid police power interests justifying infringement on liberty. Similarly, the
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer 154 favorably cited Buchanan v. Warley, but obscured the fact that
Buchanan was a due process and not an equal protection case.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Bolling Court, faced two obvious choices in justifying
its Fifth Amendment holding. First, the Court could have issued an opinion expressly relying on
an equal protection component of due process. 155 Instead, Warren asserted that the protections
152

See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1366–67 (2004) (noting that this interpretation of
these opinions had no reasonable basis).
154
See 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948).
155
In 1943, in Hirabayashi, the Court stated that “the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it
restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process.” Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). However, the Court added that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been
held to be a denial of equal protection.” Id. Moreover, the Court stated that it “may assume that these
considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact [of] the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time
of war and of threatened invasion.” Id. In Korematsu, the Court reiterated that “all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944). While the Court did not identify the source of this dictum, given that the case involved the internment of
Japanese Americans by the federal government, the logical source would be the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.
Justice Murphy, who dissented, relied explicitly on the Due Process Clause, but only as to the deprivation of
procedural due process, not substantive liberty. Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Thus, it would be logical to
interpret the majority’s reference to “civil rights” as the denial of procedural, not substantive rights, and thus an
inapt precedent for Bolling’s substantive due process holding. In any event, the Japanese plaintiffs were clearly
deprived of their liberty in the internment cases. It is therefore not at all clear that any opinion in these cases
invoking equal protection principles relied purely on discovering an equal protection component of due process, as
opposed to invoking a principle that deprivations of liberty that involve racial classifications will require a stronger
police power (or in these cases, national security) justification than would be required to justify a typical deprivation
of liberty by the Federal Government.
As for the three opinions cited by Warren for the general proposition that discrimination can be so egregious as
to violate due process, a review of the briefs filed in Bolling reveals that, ironically, these three cases were cited by
the defendants in Bolling for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause.
Brief for Respondents, Bolling v. Sharpe, 1952 WL 47280. In fact, these cases were brought to Warren’s attention
by his clerk, Earl Pollock, who cited them in pointing out to him that Bolling required a separate opinion from the
153
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provided by the Due Process Clause overlap with those provided by the Equal Protection Clause,
but failed to rely on this rationale. 156 Warren also cited the Japanese internment cases for the
proposition that racial classifications must be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 157 However, the
point of this citation appears to be that those cases raised the bar for the Federal Government to
prove that its violation of Blacks’ substantive due process liberty rights was not arbitrary.
Second, the Court could have relied explicitly on the substantive due process jurisprudence
of the 1910s and 1920s, adding the right to attend (or send one’s child to) a non-segregated
public school to the educational liberty rights identified in Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige.
Instead, Warren ignored all of the relevant substantive due process precedents except for
Buchanan v. Warley. As a result, the Bolling opinion seems incoherent, a cross between a halfhearted equal protection opinion and an inscrutable due process opinion.
As we shall in Part III, Warren originally drafted a far more coherent substantive due
process opinion, citing Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige. He modified the opinion, however, to
avoid antagonizing his colleagues, especially Justice Black, by rescusitating the Lochnerian civil
liberties opinions of the 1920s.
III. BOLLING AND LOCHNERPHOBIA
The original draft of Warren’s opinion tracks the final opinion until the section following the
citation of Buchanan v. Warley. The relevant section of the draft opinion is reprinted below.
Text common to the draft and final opinion is in italics, text that only appears in the draft opinion
is in plain text, and text that only appears in the final opinion is in strikeout:

We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the
other segregation cases, because “the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment has no direct relevance,” and
“the Fifth Amendment has repeatedly been construed by this Court not to impose the same limits on federal
discrimination as the 14th Amendment imposes on states discrimination.” Memorandum from Earl Pollock to Chief
Justice Earl Warren, May 3, 1954, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 397.
Justice Murphy also argued in a concurring opinion in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. that a
federal law that authorized mandatory collective bargaining, but allowed workers’ representatives to engage in racial
discrimination “would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amendment in this respect.” 323 U.S.
192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring). Murphy did not clearly explain why he believed such a law would violate
the Fifth Amendment, beyond to state that the “Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any race, creed or color.” Id. at 209.
156
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).
157
See id. at 499 & n.3.
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District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. Although
equal protection has been the basis of most decisions involving
racial discrimination, we have previously recognized that
discrimination may also constitute a denial of due proces of law.
The “equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of
prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we
do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But,
as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Unreasonable and arbitrary classifications may be a denial of
due process of law. Classifications based solely upon race must be
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. As long ago as 1896,
this Court declared the principle “that the Constitution of the
United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and
political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General
Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his
race.” 158 Thus, And in Buchanan v. Warley, this Court held that a
statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his
property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable
discrimination, a denial of due process of law.
The Court has applied similar reasoning to analogous situations
in the field of education, the very subject now before us [citing
Meyer and its companion case, Bartels v. Iowa; Pierce; and
Tokushige]. Thus children and parents are deprived of the liberty
158

This sentence appeared two sentences earlier in the original draft opinion.
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protected by the Due Process Clause when the children are
prohibited from pursuing certain courses, or from attending private
schools or foreign-language schools. Such prohibitions were
found to be unreasonable, and unrelated to any legitimate
governmental objective. Just as a government may not impose
arbitrary restrictions on the parent’s right to educate his child, the
government must not impose arbitrary restrints on access to the
education which the government itself provides.
Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with
any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from
bodily restraint. The essence of liberty is the Liberty under law
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue., and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective. We have no hesitation in concluding that
segregation of children in the public schools is a far greater
restriction on their liberty than were the restrictions in the school
casees discussed above. Segregation in the public schools places
the brand of inferiority on the minority group, saps them of their
motivation to obtain an education, and thus hampers them
throughout life [Citing Brown]. Segregation in public education is
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and
thus it imposes on these children Negro children of the District of
Columbia a burden that which constitutes an arbitrary deprivation
of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Due process is not a static concept: “It is of the very nature of a
free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed
resonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due
process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may
at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of
fundamental rights.” [quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
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(1949)]. 159 We have declared that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. It
would be unthinkable that that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government should have a
lesser duty to protect what, in our present circumstances, is a
fundamental liberty. 160
Thus, the draft Bolling opinion relied on the idea that the right to pursue an education (or to
educate one’s children) was a fundamental liberty, a sconclusion amply supported not only by
the holdings of Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige, but also by dictum in Meyer and Pierce stating
that liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause include the “right to acquire useful
knowledge.” 161 While Meyer and Pierce were Fourteenth Amendment due process cases,
Tokushige relied on those cases in interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 162
Once the right to educational liberty was recognized, it was a short leap to Warren’s
conclusion that just “as a government may not impose arbitrary restrictions on the parent’s right
to educate his child, the government must not impose arbitrary restraints on access to the
education which the government itself provides.” 163 And Brown clearly signified that the Court
believed that segregation based on notions of white supremacy was an arbitrary restraint on
public school education. Note that Warren did not contend that states are obligated to provide
public education. Rather, his argument was that once they undertake to do so, they cannot
restrict the rights of their citizens to participate in that system except in pursuit of a proper
governmental objective.
As a hand-edited draft of Bolling found in Warren’s papers reveals, Warren dropped the
initial opinion’s reliance on the 1920s precedents and its reliance on an explicit liberty interest in
educational freedom because of objections from Justice Hugo Black. 164 Black’s objection was
159

An earlier, undated draft of the opinion found in Warren’s papers contains an additional line here, struck out by
Warren: “Our ideal of due process is an exapanding concept.”
160
Undated draft, Bolling v. Sharpe, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 571.
161
Indeed, the plaintiffs quoted this language from Meyer in their brief. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 4).
162
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927).
163
This was, in fact, precisely the argument made in the plaintiffs’ briefs and during oral argument. Brief for
Petitioners at 13, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 4). Text of the oral argument can be found at
http://www.lib.umich.edu/exhibits/brownarchive/oral/Hayes&Nabrit.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
164
The draft shows that Warren wrote next to the citations to Meyer, Pierce, Bartels, and Farrington, and the
accompanying text, “strikeout Black”, “Black strikeout,” and “Out”; next to a citation to Meyer “Black strike out
citation”, and “Black out,” and next to expansive due process language and an accompnaying footnote to Wolf v.
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consistent with his general attitude toward “substantive due process.” In his dissent in Griswold
v. Connecticut, for example, Black criticized the Court’s reliance on Meyer and Pierce. 165 In the
course of excoriating the Court for relying on those opinions’ “natural law due process
philosophy,” Black claimed that Bolling “merely recognized what had been the understanding
from the beginning of the country . . . that the whole Bill of Rights, including the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, was a guarantee that all persons would receive equal treatment
under the law.” 166
While Black and perhaps others 167 dissuaded Warren from relying on Lochner era due
process opinions, the Bolling opinion still concluded that segregation violated liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause. Recall that the actual holding of Bolling is that
“[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.” 168
The Bolling Court, then, relied on a due process argument, but failed to identify precisely what
liberty interest was involved, and also failed to cite relevant Lochner era opinions. The due
process argument therefore lacks coherence, and seems poorly reasoned. 169
Indeed, the Court’s substantive due process ruling was so watered-down and cryptic that, as
we have seen, 170 Black later claimed, contrary to the evidence, 171 that Bolling was actually (and

Colorado “Black says strike” and Black-out.” Warren also eliminated the line, “Segregation in the public schools
places the brand of inferiority on the minority group, saps them of their motivation to obtain an education, and thus
hampers them throughout life [Citing Brown]” at the suggestion of Stanley Reed, with agreement from Black.
Undated draft of Bolling v. Sharpe, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 571.
165
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
166
Id. at 517 n.10.
167
Though there is no record that he objected to the draft Bolling opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter could not have
been pleased with the favorable citation to Meyer and Pierce. In 1944, Frankfurter refused to join the Court’s
opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts because it favorably cited Meyer and Pierce. He argued that Justice Holmes’
dissent in Meyer was correct, and that “I shall turn out to be a bad prophet indeed if this Court will not come to rue
the implications of Pierce v. Society of Sisters.” Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Justice Rutledge, Jan. 22, 1944,
quoted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking and the Supreme Court, 19481958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 48 (1979).
168
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
169
“Although the ‘fundamental liberty’ analysis stood on shaky, even discredited, ground, it was at least
precedented.” Hutchinson, supra note 166, at 50. Part of the problem, no doubt, was the extraordinary haste in
which Bolling was drafted. The initial drafting was assigned to Warren clerks on May 4, 1954, the draft was
distributed to the other Justices on May 8, their comments were received the following week, and the opinion was
released on May 17.
170
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
171
As shown in the annotated Bolling opinion produced above, the basis for the draft opinion was clearly a
substantive due process rationale with equal protection dicta, and the final opinion only subtracts from the
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solely) an equal protection case. The Court itself, perhaps unable to decipher Warren’s cryptic
final opinion, later adopted that interpretation of Bolling. But for Warren’s catering to Black’s
Lochnerphobia, it would have been clear that the Bolling holding was not based on equal
protection. Rather, like Buchanan v. Warley, it was a due process case holding that a violation of
due process rights via racial classification will require a solid, nondiscriminatory police power
justification.
Indeed, Warren’s draft due process opinion arguably made a stronger case for the
unconstitutionality of racial segregation under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause than
the Court’s opinion in Brown made for the unconstitutionality of racial segregation under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. If nothing else, the draft Bolling opinion
logically follows from precedents like Buchanan, Meyer, and Tokushige, while Brown required
the Court to reverse Plessy.
The Court’s Lochnerphobia weakened Bolling in other ways as well. Even Warren’s draft
opinion remains vulnerable to the charge that it’s absurd to think that the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, enacted at a time when the Federal Government enforced the fugitive slave
clause, 172 and held, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, to protect slaveowners’ property rights in their
slaves, could be interpreted to ban segregated schools. 173 Here Warren could have sought help
from Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, and authored a paragraph along the following lines:

In Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, we considered the issue of
whether women could still be presumptively be considered to have
lesser rights under the Fourteenth Amendment than have men, a
position that would have been consistent with the views of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Speaking through Justice
Sutherland, we noted that the Nineteenth Amendment, and the
social and political changes that led to its passage, had changed the
status of women such that they were now full citizens in American
society entitled to equal rights under the Constitution. While
discussion justifying the substantive due process holding, without adding anything about equal protection.
172
U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2 (“No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour,
but shall be delivered up on Claim of Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).
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Adkins has been overruled on its precise holding that the special
needs of women cannot be taken into account in the process of
regulating industrial employment, the broader legal principle
invoked, that subsequent amendments can change our intepretation
of the meaning of due process, remains valid. The Fourteenth
Amendment granted Negroes full rights of national citizenship,
and the Federal Government may therefore no longer arbitrarily
deprive them of liberty rights encompassed by the Due Process
Clause.

If Warren succumbed to Lochnerphobia in failing to cite Meyer and Pierce, it’s not surprising
that he was unwilling to cite Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, among the most reviled cases of the
Lochner era.
The Court’s Lochnerphobia caused another problem. To the extent that Bolling has come to
stand for the proposition that the concept of due process contains a guarantee of equal protection
of the laws, critics can aptly note that the post-Lochner era precedents Warren relied on were
weak at best. However, ample precedent from the Lochner era supported the notion that due
process overlaps with equal protection, and some cases and commentators from that era (and also
from the Gilded Age) argued that, at least as far as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
was concerned, due process provided the same equality guarantees as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
As noted above, an Adkins-style argument in Bolling could satisfy the “originalist” 174
objection that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to protect the rights of African Americans.
An originalist might still object that even if the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
included a notion of equality, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not; that
opposition to “class legislation” was not part of American constitutional discourse during the
173

See Graglia, supra note 35, at 771.
While one originalist methodology would be to argue that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to apply to
African Americans, other originalists would note that the Fifth Amendment speaks only of “persons,” not “whites.”
Given that the meaning of the word “person” is not race-exclusive, and given the natural rights background of the
Constitution, which provides a rule of construction to interpret ambiguous provisions, these originalists could argue
that the Fifth Amendment did indeed include African Americans within its purview, even if the Framers did not
intend it to do so. For a good discussion of originalism, natural rights, and rules of construction, see RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 125–30 (2004).
174
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Founding era, and was not written into American constitutional law until the Reconstruction era.
A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, but suffice for now to say that
the idea that due process includes a guarantee that all laws be “equal and general” goes back to
the founding era and beyond. 175
The question also arises as to whether an explicit recognition in Bolling of a liberty right to
pursue an education would have mandated a different result in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, which held that in the absence of racially discriminatory intent, unequal
funding of public schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 176 Under a Lochnerian
analysis, the question would be whether a state was exceeding its police powers in allowing local
jurisdictions to be the primary funders of public schools, given the funding disparities that would
inevitably arise. States would likely argue that Bolling should be distinguished: no Texas law
prevented an individual who wanted her son to attend a particular public school from moving to
that district, so the right to pursue an education was not infringed. Moreover, given the
advantages of local funding (and thus control) of public schools, local school funding not an
arbitrary policy, and a lack of arbitrariness is all that’s needed to satisfy a Lochnerian test.
However, Warren’s draft Bolling opinion, though Lochnerian in its underlying origins, had
declared that the right to pursue an education was a fundamental right. 177 Under modern due
process law, a right’s status as fundamental means that any infringement of the right is subject to
strict scrutiny—the government’s actions must not be simply reasonable and non-arbitrary, but
also must further compelling interests and be narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
Assuming interdistrict disparities in funding were found to infringe on the right to pursue an
education, it would have been difficult to justify these disparities under a compelling interest test.
Even without that assumption, the effect on desegregation lawsuits, in particular, would have
been dramatic: plaintiffs would not have had to show that the inequality of resources in black and
white schools was traceable to the maintenance of a dual system (discriminatory intent), but
rather simply that the inequality infringed on black students’ right to pursue their education
without compelling justification.

175

See GILLMAN, supra note 73; Taylor, supra note 107, at 303–04.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
177
See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
176
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CONCLUSION
A careful analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe reveals some surprises. First, the almost universal
portrayal of Bolling as an opinion relying on an “equal protection component” of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is incorrect. The opinion is vague and opaque, but a
comparison of Chief Justice Warren’s original draft opinion with the final opinion makes it clear
that the Court’s precise holding was that school segregation in the District of Columbia
arbitrarily violated black students’ right to educational liberty. Bolling, then, was a substantive
due process opinion with roots in Lochner era cases such as Buchanan v. Warley, Meyer v.
Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Farrington v. Tokushige, even though the Court
ultimately chose to cite only Buchanan.
Among other things, Bolling’s roots in Lochnerian cases belies the oft-heard notion that the
Lochner line of cases was somehow directly at odds with racial equality, and that the overruling
of those cases in the 1930s was a necessary prelude to Brown. 178 Indeed, not only did the
Lochner line of cases not stand in the way of a broad interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, Bolling shows that de jure segregation was actually highly vulnerable to Lochnerian
argument. The Court simply had to recognize that exclusion of Blacks from government
services provided to whites was properly understood as a denial of Blacks’ liberty. 179
Arguably, Bolling also shows the potential for a racially egalitarian jurisprudence to have
emerged in a political environment far closer to America’s libertarian tradition than what had
emerged by the 1950s. As the author of this Essay wrote over a decade ago,

It is possible to imagine that but for the interruption of the Great
Depression and the New Deal, entirely different forms of civil
rights protections would have arisen—a laissez-faire combination
178

See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 147 (1991) (making this argument). For an
argument that Lochnerian cases actually shielded Blacks from protectionist labor laws promoted by white interest
groups, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND
THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001).
179
This shift certainly required an abandonment of the Court’s previous position that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not address issues of “social equality.” However, as the first Justice Harlan’s career shows, there is no inherent
contradiction between sympathy with Lochnerian reasoning and support for a broad understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that prohibiting colleges from having integrated student bodies violated the right of teachers to
pursue their occupations free from unreasonable government interference); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (Harlan, J.) (concluding that a law banning employers from firing union members was an arbitrary violation
of liberty of contract).
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of equal protection of the law, liberty of contract, and freedom of
association, instead of the more statist combination of interest
group liberalism, the welfare state, and government enforcement of
nondiscrimination norms against private parties. 180

Some would argue, however, that once a Lochnerian Court acknowledged that access to a
government-provided service could be construed as a liberty right, the entire classical
liberal/libertarian edifice of Lochner would be lost. After all, libertarianism is premised on the
notion that all rights against the government are negative rights. On the other hand, a libertarian
might argue that to subsidize one group is the economic equivalent of taxing its competitors. To
subsidize whites’ education more than Blacks’ education—whether through extra monetary aid
to white schools or merely by requiring Blacks to go to separate schools and thus, in the context
of a racist society, inherently relegating them to second-class education—is, by economists’
lights, the equivalent of taxing Blacks more than whites. The right to be free from discriminatory
taxation on an arbitrary basis such as race is certainly within the scope of the classical
liberal/libertarian paradigm.
Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was not simply “made up” by
the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding precedent. The idea that the protection from
discrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment is precisely the same as that provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as the Court held subsequent to Bolling, is
more of a stretch, but even that view has precedent in cases and commentary from the Gilded
Age and the Lochner era. 181
Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia on
Supreme Court jurisprudence. As discussed above, Bolling would have been a much stronger
opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer and
Tokushige, and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, the Justices’ Lochnerphobia eventually led the Court to abandon the liberty-to-pursuean-education basis of Bolling entirely, in favor of an equal protection interpretation of the case.
180
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Because the cursory equal protection analysis in Bolling was not supported by citations to
relevant pre-New Deal precedents, the Court subsequently instead took to heart Bolling’s
admonition that it would be “unthinkable” to permit the Federal Government to discriminate
when the states were banned from doing so. The result has been the curious doctrine of “reverse
incorporation” under which the Court has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
somehow incorporates against the Federal Government the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
Bolling is hardly the only Supreme Court opinion that was been distorted by the Justices’
Lochnerphobia. Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut infamously
relied on the (to put it charitably) novel argument that the “penumbras and emanations” of
various parts of the Bill of Rights created a fundamental right to privacy protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.182 Douglas explicitly disclaimed any intention of
reviving Lochner, and,while he favorably cited Meyer and Pierce, he baselessly reinterpreted
them as First Amendment cases. 183 Justice John Marshall Harlan’s lone concurrence, by
contrast, relied on on traditional Lochnerian substantive due process reasoning. He argued that
the Due Process Clause protects “basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” with
regulations that infringed on liberty permitted only if they were reasonably related to legitimate
police power concerns. 184
Of late, the Court’s Lochnerphobia seems to waning. The Court still rejects the economic
substantive due process cases of the Lochner era, such as Lochner itself and Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital. 185 But in a string of recent opinions, a majority of the Court has otherwise embraced a
Lochnerian interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause consistent with
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See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 153, at 1570 (calling this “plain sophistry”).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 482 (1965)
184
Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the plurality opinion explained that the reason the Court overruled Adkins was
because “[i]n the meantime, the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false
factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human
welfare.” Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (plurality opinion). Justice Souter
later explained that the principle espoused in Lochner-era cases that arbitrary deprivations of liberty violated due
process is “unobjectionable,” but “while the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of
constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the
standard they espoused.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760–61 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
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Meyer, Pierce, and Justice Harlan’s opinion in Griswold. 186 The penumbral right to privacy has
given way to a broader protection of liberty interests against arbitrary governmental interference,
and the sharp, post-Lochner era distinction between fundamental liberty rights protected by strict
scrutiny and other liberty interests protected only by very limited scrutiny has eroded. 187 In the
2002-03 term, the Court held that both standardless punitive damages awards 188 and restrictions
on homosexual sodomy 189 constituted arbitrary violations of rights protected by due process
considerations, even though the Court identified no relevant “fundamental rights.” The Court
instead implicitly concluded that animus toward big business or homosexuals, even if based in
deeply-rooted notions of morality, were not valid police power justifications of the defendants’
otherwise arbitrary deprivations of the plaintiffs’ liberty interests.
In this climate, where Lochnerian substantive due process protection of liberty interests has
become relatively routine, though not uncontroversial, 190 perhaps the time has come for courts
and commentators to reconsider the Bolling opinion. Bolling was a substantive due process
opinion, shorn of precedent and coherent reasoning by a Court afraid of its own Lochnerian
shadow. As a result, Bolling receives little support from legal scholars, and has been
misintrepreted as a pure equal protection opinion. In fact, with its roots in Buchanan v. Warley
and the 1920s educational liberty cases, the liberty right to be free from compelled segregation in
education is perhaps better grounded than the liberty right to terminate one’s pregnancy, to
engage in homosexual sodomy, or to be free from arbitrary punitive damages awards. This will
not satisfy critics like Bork who oppose the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence across
the board. But for the vast majority of legal scholars who do support the Court’s current
substantive due process jurisprudence, Bolling should be an easy case to defend.
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